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Abstract 
Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in 
civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical 
principles, Bazargan-Forward argues that those very principles will 
yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, 
the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent 
than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is 
because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often increase 
the expected welfare of the individuals upon whom the risk is imposed, 
(b) are often imposed with consent, and (c) are often imposed 
reciprocally. The conclusion—that we have a pro tanto reason for 
adopting a more stringent standard of risk imposition toward foreign 
innocents in war—has implications for not only what standards of risk 
we should adopt in war, but also how we should weigh domestic versus 
foreign civilian lives. 
 
1. Background 
We often act in ways that foreseeably but unintentionally (i.e., collaterally) 
risk infringing the rights that other people have. We routinely to do this in 
war. We put innocent enemy civilians at risk directly by attacking military 
targets with civilians nearby. And we put innocent enemy civilians at risk 
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indirectly by disrupting or destroying civilian facilities and infrastructure.1 
Risky conduct is not limited to war, however. We also act in ways that risk 
infringing the rights of innocents in everyday civil life. We construct dams 
and nuclear power plants posing small but significant risks of catastrophe, we 
construct airports in densely populated zones, we build factories that emit 
carcinogens, we fund and maintain a criminal justice system and a health 
care system which risk harming innocents, and so on. And individuals 
routinely impose risks on each other in civil life as well, most notably by 
driving automobiles. 
There are presumably moral standards that govern imposing risks on 
innocents in both the context of war and in the context of civil life. We 
might think that the moral standards governing risk-imposition in civil life 
are more stringent than the moral standards governing risk-imposition in 
warfare. After all, warfare – even ethical warfare – is ineliminably a 
destructive activity, whereas the risks we impose in a technologically 
advanced society are the side-effects of individual and collective constructive 
endeavors. Accordingly, we might think that the norms governing risk-
imposition would reflect this difference.  
But according to revisionism2 about the ethics of war, there are no sui 
generis moral principles governing the resort to or conduct in warfare. The 
moral principles governing our conduct in everyday civil life are at the most 
fundamental level the same as those governing our conduct in war, in the 
following sense: in either context, we are permitted to put innocents at 
substantial risk of lethal harms if doing so is necessary to avert a harm of 
sufficient moral importance. It just so happens that this condition is fulfilled 
more often in the context of warfare than in context of domestic civil life. 
But the stringency of the constraint articulating a) what goods can be 
legitimacy sought by way of putting others are substantial risk, and b) how 
                                                          
1 The Geneva Declaration Secretariat states, based on data from armed conflicts 
between 2004 and 2007, that “a reasonable average estimate would be a ratio of four 
indirect deaths to one direct death in contemporary conflicts” (Geneva Declaration 
Secretariat, 2011, p. 32). 
2 For example of revisionist work in the ethics of war, see (McMahan, 2009), (Fabre, 
2012), (Frowe, 2015), and (Draper, 2015), among others.  
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much good must be achieved by doing so given the degree of risk imposed, 
applies univocally. 
Revisionists are correct in arguing that there are no sui generis moral 
principles governing the resort to or conduct in warfare. But I will argue that 
there are nonetheless contingent differences between warfare and domestic 
civil life which ground contingent differences in standards governing risk-
imposition in the two contexts. In particular, I will argue that there is at 
least one reason for thinking –  perhaps surprisingly – that the moral 
standards governing risks imposed on innocents in warfare will tend to be 
more stringent than the moral standards governing risks imposed on 
innocents in civil life.  
I argue that in the context of civil life there are at least three factors 
affecting the permissibility of imposing a risk of a given degree on an 
innocent. The first is whether imposing that risk increases the expected 
welfare of the individual upon whom the risk is imposed. The second is 
whether the individual upon whom the risk is imposed consents to that risk. 
And the third is whether the individual upon whom that risk is imposed 
reciprocally imposes that risk on others. These factors, when present, 
individually and jointly reduce the stringency of the standards governing 
risks imposed on innocents relative to contexts in which these factors are 
absent. And I argue that these factors are routinely present in civil life but 
rarely present in warfare. The result is that there is at least one important 
reason for thinking that the standards governing risks imposed on innocents 
in war are actually more stringent than those governing risks imposed on 
innocents in the context of domestic civil life.   
Some writers seem to assume that if a standard governing risks imposed on 
innocents is acceptable in domestic civil life, then certainly it must be an 
acceptable standard for imposing risks on innocent enemy civilians in war. 
The assumption, in other words, is that warfare does not raise the standards 
governing-risk imposition. Take, for example, Jeff McMahan’s argument 
against what I call ‘proportionality-based’ contingent pacifism.3 He argues 
                                                          
3 This type of pacifism states that wars, as they are currently fought and will 
continue to be fought in the foreseeable future, are unjust on the grounds that the 
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against this type of contingent pacifism by attempting to show that the 
restriction against killing innocents is not as strong as proportionality-based 
contingent pacifists think.4 Contrary to what contingent pacifists believe, he 
argues, the restriction does not prohibit killing a few innocents as a necessary 
means or side-effect of preventing the wrongful killing  of many others. 
Crucially, McMahan attempts to show this by arguing that if under 
conditions of uncertainty we adopt a very stringent constraint against killing, 
we thereby commit ourselves to denying that accepted practices in domestic 
civil life are in fact morally impermissible. And herein lies the problematic 
assumption that I’ve alluded to: namely, that the standards governing risks 
imposed on innocent enemy civilians in war are no more stringent than the 
standards governing risks imposed on innocent in civil life. But if I am right, 
there are consistently present contingent factors that pry apart these two 
standards of risk-imposition in that there will typically be a reason favoring 
greater standards of care toward innocent enemy civilians than toward our 
own.  
How we compare standards of risk-imposition in war and in civil live is also 
relevant to the broader issue in just war theory of how we comparatively 
weigh domestic versus foreign civilian lives. Sometimes the only way to save 
the lives of our own civilians is by collaterally killing enemy civilians. 
Whether doing so is permissible depends in part on how we weigh these lives 
in the calculation of proportionality. Thomas Hurka has argued that in such 
cases co-national partiality permit us to partially discount the weight that 
the lives of innocent enemy civilians receive relative to the weight that the 
lives of innocent domestic civilians receive.5 I also argue in favor of such 
discounting, but for very different reasons: civilians can vest an agent-relative 
privilege to weigh their own lives more heavily in the combatants fighting on 
their behalf in furtherance of achieving just aims, which thereby permits 
those combatants to partially discount the lives of enemy civilians in the 
                                                                                                                                         
good they achieve cannot justify the harm they cause. For more on contingent 
pacifism see (Bazargan, 2014). 
4 (McMahan, Pacifism and Moral Theory, 2010). 
5 (Hurka, 2005). 
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calculation of proportionality.6 Now, if the operative standard governing risks 
imposed on enemy civilians in war is more stringent than the operative 
standard governing risk in civil life – which is what I argue here – it will 
have consequences for how we comparatively assign weights to domestic 
versus foreign civilian lives in the context of war. Specifically, it will imply 
that we ought to add in the mix of considerations relevant to comparatively 
evaluating domestic versus foreign civilian lives an important pro tanto 
reason (which does not vitiate the reasons running in the opposite direction) 
in favor of weighing the lives of innocent enemy civilians more heavily than 
the lives of innocent domestic civilians.  
In what immediately follows I discuss three factors morally relevant to 
assessing the permissibility of imposing a given risk on an innocent. I then 
argue that the relevance of these factors provides an important consideration 
in favor of the view that we have more stringent duties of care toward 
foreign innocents in war than toward our own in everyday civil life.  
 
2. Consent, Benefit, and Reciprocation  
Organizations both public and private often provide goods and services that 
impose small but significant risks of catastrophe upon those to whom the 
goods and services are provided. But (ideally) these risk-imposing projects 
and policies generally accrue net benefits to those who are put at risk. To 
reiterate several examples presented earlier: transportation facilities, 
factories, power plants, the criminal justice system, the health care system, 
and so on, are all supposed to make everyone better off which is partly what 
justifies the risks that these projects impose. Or more accurately, these 
projects and policies increase everyone’s expected welfare; it is accordingly 
antecedently rational in the evidence-relative sense7 to accept the risk in 
question, which I will call a ‘beneficial risk’. Of course, often such risks are 
illicitly shifted to populations with less political, economic, and social capital, 
while the benefits accrue to others, more privileged individuals. This is an 
                                                          
6 (Bazargan-Forward, (forthcoming)). 
7 This is Derek Parfit’s terminology. See (Parfit, 2011, pp. 150-174). For a defense, 
see (Tadros, 2011, pp. 214-40). 
In The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict (Palgrave) / Published 2017 /  
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-57123-2 
 
6 
 
injustice. But part of what explains why this is unjust is itself parasitic on 
the view that certain risk-imposing activities and policies are justified by the 
benefits accrued to those upon whom the risks are imposed.  
This is not to say that so long as a risk increases expected welfare imposing 
it is permissible. Respect for the autonomy of others requires that we defer to 
them by seeking their consent where possible for imposing even those risks it 
would be antecedently rational for them to accept. In democracies, the 
decision to impose beneficial risks is (supposed to be) made via a decision 
procedure whereby an individual’s participation in it (or even an individual’s 
voluntary decision not to participate in it) confers consent to the outcome of 
that procedure – even if the outcome is contrary to that individual’s 
preferred outcome. A referendum is an obvious example of such a procedure. 
More often, though, an official or group of officials make the decision to 
impose (or to allow imposing) the beneficial risk in question. As long as those 
official are fairly voted into office, and as long as the decision to impose or 
allow the beneficial risk resides legitimately within the ambit of their 
authority, their decision preserves the consent of the people –or so goes the 
theory. The upshot is that fairly distributed beneficial risks imposed under 
these circumstances satisfy the requirement of consent.  
Suppose, though, that the risk of harm manifests – the nuclear power plant 
has a meltdown, the hydroelectric dam bursts, the refinery or the 
manufacturing plant causes those living in its vicinity to suffer from a 
disproportionately high rate of cancer, the criminal justice system imprisons 
some innocents, the health care system harms some of those it’s tasked with 
providing medical assistance, and so on. How do we morally evaluate these 
harms? Supposing that – a) those who suffer these harms consented to the 
risk, and b) those who suffer the harms were nonetheless antecedently 
expected beneficiaries of that risk – we ought to substantially discount the 
weight that those harms receive in a proportionality calculation.  
To see this, suppose that we have to decide between two courses of action. 
The first course of action imposes a risk statistically likely to result in a 
hundred deaths over the next decade, but which also results in substantial 
gains for the survivors who number in the tens of millions. The risk was 
imposed consensually and it increased the expected welfare of everyone on 
whom it was imposed. We can, alternatively, take a course of action that is 
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overwhelmingly likely to reduce the number of deaths from 100 to 75. 
However, it does so by shifting the risk from those who are antecedently 
expected to benefit to those who are not (and accordingly do not consent to 
being put at risk in this way). Though this alternative course of action saves 
25 lives, it is arguably less preferable.  
We might make sense of the moral difference between the two courses of 
actions in one of two ways. The resulting deaths in either course of action 
receives negative weight in the proportionality calculation determining the 
permissibility of each course of action. But perhaps the 75 deaths in the 
second course of action receive greater negative weight than the 100 deaths 
in the first course of action because the 75 but not the 100 were wronged. 
Alternatively, we might think that the victims in both courses of actions 
were wronged, but that the 75 were wronged more severely than the 100 
precisely because the 75, unlike the 100, were not antecedent beneficiaries 
and did not consent to bearing the risk. I tend to think that the first 
explanation is correct on the grounds that the victims suffer bad option luck. 
Others might demur. But regardless of which explanation is correct, the 75 
deaths would be weighed more heavily than the 100 deaths. I will call this 
upshot: 
‘The Consent Principle’ 
We ought to partially discount the disvalue that a harm receives in a 
proportionality calculation if that harm is the result of a manifested 
risk imposed on individuals who consented to that risk. 
One might point out, though, that most people in the world do not live 
under conditions that satisfy the conditions specified in the Consent 
Principle. Even in advanced democracies, the prevalence of social injustices 
cast doubt on whether those who are antecedently expected to benefit from a 
risky project consent to it given that such risks are often disproportionately 
borne by those with less political, social, and economic capital.  
Does, then, imposing a beneficial risk on those who do not consent to that 
risk violate their right not to be harmed? Not if risks of harm do not 
themselves qualify as harms.8 Still, by imposing that risk upon them we 
                                                          
8 For a modern classical on this issue, see (Finkelstein, 2003). 
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violate their autonomy even if the risk does not manifest. If the risk does 
indeed manifest, the victims are certainly wrongfully harmed, and egregiously 
so. But whether they were expected beneficiaries still has a role to play in 
assessing the wrongfulness of that harm. I contend that it is morally worse to 
harm an innocent by imposing a risk which ultimately manifests where that 
risk antecedently decreases the victim’s expected welfare than it is to harm 
an innocent by imposing a risk which ultimately manifests where that risk 
antecedently increases the victim’s expected welfare. This is certainly not to 
say that we are morally permitted to impose non-consensual risks that 
increase the victim’s expected welfare. Rather, the claim is that doing so isn’t 
as wrongful as imposing a non-consensual risks that decreases the victim’s 
expected welfare.  
Why this is so depends on the sort of transformative work consent does. We 
might think that that there is merely a prima facie reason to increase the 
expected welfare of others; the reason is prima facie in that the absence of 
consent does not merely outweigh but eliminates the considerations in favor 
of that reason. The result is that absent (available) consent there is no 
residual reason – not even an outweighed one – to increase the expected 
welfare of that individual. Alternatively, we might think that there is always 
at least a pro tanto reason to increase the expected welfare of others, but a 
stronger reason to refrain from acting contrary to the way that individual 
consents to be treated. Absent that (available) consent, the pro tanto reason 
is still operative but is outweighed by the strength of the reasons to refrain 
from acting non-consensually.  
Which characterization of consent’s transformative power is correct? I believe 
that the second is. To see why, assume that by reductio the first were 
correct. Now, suppose for example that we have no choice but to treat one of 
two persons non-consensually: we can either prohibit Person A from smoking 
or we can prohibit Person B from exercising. In both cases we’ll be acting 
against the victim’s will in that Person A’s considered preference is to 
continue smoking and Person B’s considered preference is to continue 
exercising. If we have to choose one, it makes sense to choose the former 
rather than the latter in that it seems we can repair to paternalistic reasons 
where we have no choice but to violate autonomy. But this reasoning is 
unavailable if the absence of consent does not merely outweigh but eliminates 
paternalistic reasons. Accordingly, I take it that consent as it applies to the 
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permissibility of imposing benefits does not function by transforming the 
normative valence of the reason to provide that benefit, but rather functions 
by providing a distinctive reason – one of substantially greater strength than 
paternalistic reasons – to act in accordance with the person’s (considered) 
wishes. If this is correct, we should think that imposing non-consensual risks 
increasing the victim’s expected welfare is wrong, but not as wrong as 
imposing non-consensual risks decreasing the victim’s expected welfare. I 
summarize this as follows: 
‘The Beneficiary Principle’9 
The disvalue that a harm to an innocent receives in a proportionality 
calculation, where that harm is the result of imposing a risk that 
increases expected welfare, ought to be partially discounted relative 
to the weight that an equally severe harm would receive where that 
harm is the result of imposing a risk that decreases expected welfare.  
So even in places – such as in non-democratic countries or in countries with 
malfunctioning democracies – where beneficial risks are imposed non-
consensually, the weight that the resulting harms receive in the calculation of 
proportionality will be less than the weight that harms receive resulting from 
non-consensually imposing non-beneficial risks.  
The discounting in the Consent Principle is presumably greater than the 
discounting in the Beneficiary Principle. But the point here is that in both 
cases the harms will be discounted relative to those resulting from risks that 
decrease expected welfare. And even if the discounting in the latter case is 
relatively small, they are aggregative, as I will argue.  
So far I have argued that when imposing beneficial risks results in a harm, 
we ought to partially discount the weight that those harms receive in the 
proportionality calculation if the risks were imposed in a way that respected 
the victim’s autonomy. And even when this condition is not satisfied, we still 
ought to partially discount (albeit less so) the weight that the harm receives 
                                                          
9 Daniel Butt, among others, discuss a related principle which states that the 
unwilling beneficiary of wrongful acts have duties of restitution to that act’s victims. 
Such a principle is largely orthogonal to the one I’m espousing here. See (Butt, 2007).   
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in the proportionality calculation on the grounds that imposing the risk 
increases the expected welfare of the victim.  
But there are some risks imposed on many of us on nearly a daily basis in 
domestic civil life which are not antecedently expected to benefit us. Notably, 
most of us on nearly a daily basis are put at risk by other drivers. And unlike 
the risk of being harmed by malfunctioning public projects and policies – 
such as power plants, the criminal justice system, the health care system, and 
so on – the presence of other drivers presumably does not yield a net increase 
to any given driver’s expected welfare.  
If drivers nonetheless consent to a regime permitting such risks, then 
imposing such a risks is presumably permissible. The result is that the harms 
resulting from such risks ought to receive diminished weight in the 
proportionality calculation, in accordance with the Consent Principle, even if 
they do not increase any given individual’s expected welfare. But what about 
drivers who do not consent to such a regime?  I argue that even for such 
individuals the harms that result from the manifestation of the risk imposed 
upon them by other drivers ought to be partially discounted in a calculation 
of proportionality when and if such risks manifest – even if they do not 
consent to being subjected to such risks. This is because most individuals 
reciprocally impose such a risks on others, substantially reducing their 
standing to complain about being subjected to such a risk themselves. I am 
not relying on the claim (true though it might be) that it is permissible to 
impose unconsented risks on others in furtherance of achieving your 
legitimate aims if they do the same to you. Rather, I am appealing to a more 
conservative claim: even if imposing reciprocally non-consensual and non-
beneficial risks on others is impermissible, the stringency of the requirement 
not to do so is substantially diminished when they are doing it to you. This 
diminishes the negative weight that such harms receive (when they manifest) 
in the proportionality calculation, yielding the following:  
‘The Reciprocation Principle’  
There is a moral requirement that you refrain from imposing a non-
consensual, non-beneficial, and non-trivial risk on another in 
furtherance of your otherwise legitimate aims. But the stringency of 
this requirement is substantially reduced if the individual upon 
whom you impose that risk is likewise imposing a non-consensual, 
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non-beneficial, and non-trivial risk of roughly the same degree upon 
you. Hence, such harms ought to receive diminished weight in the 
calculation of proportionality.   
Of course, not all drivers impose the same risks on each other. Some people 
drive more often, more dangerously, and in crash-incomparable vehicles.10 
But take a driver who imposes on average a smaller risk on others than the 
typical driver imposes on her. This imbalance in risk-imposition gives her a 
prima facie basis for complaint should a more risky driver cause her harm. 
But her standing to complain is still diminished relative to someone who 
imposes no reciprocal risk at all. The strength of the standing to complain is 
determined in part by the difference in the degree of mutually imposed risk. 
The badness of the harm that the more risky driver causes to the less risky 
driver is still diminished relative to the badness of the harm that the more 
risky driver causes someone who imposes no such risk.  
But what about individuals who not only refrain from consenting to a regime 
permitting driving but who do not drive? Even such individuals derive pro 
tanto benefits from the driving of others. Stores are stocked -- schools, 
hospitals, and a variety of others socially beneficial institutions both public 
and private are staffed and maintained -- through the use of automobiles. It 
is true that an alternative regime restricting or eliminating private auto use 
in favor of mass transportation would substantially increase everyone’s 
expected welfare. Relative to that possible regime, the status quo does indeed 
diminish expected welfare. Nonetheless, accepting the pro tanto benefits of 
the risk-imposing activities of others in ways that create demand for and 
thereby contribute to the risk-imposing driving of others might (arguably) 
reduce one’s standing to complain about being exposed to such risks for 
reasons similar to why reciprocally imposing that risk likewise diminishes 
one’s standing to complain. But most of these contributions will be marginal 
and indirect relative to the risks we impose by actually driving. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that these sorts of contributions will substantially 
diminish the negative weight that the deaths of these contributors receive in 
the proportionality calculation.  
 
                                                          
10 For discussion, see (Husak, 2004). 
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But we need not belabor this issue since the fact remains that the presence of 
some individuals who refrain from driving on principled grounds does not 
vitiate the general thesis that the Principles of Consent, Benefit, and 
Reciprocation provide reasons for thinking that the duties of care toward 
foreign innocents in war are more stringent than toward our own civilians in 
peacetime – or so I will argue.   
  
3. Comparative Duties of Care 
The Consent, Benefit, and Reciprocation Principles, if correct, generally 
provide reasons for partially discounting the harms resulting from many of 
the risks we impose on innocents in civil life. Yet the Principles have little to 
no purchase in most wars in that they do not generally provide reasons for 
partially discounting the harms resulting from the risks we impose on foreign 
innocents in the course of waging even just wars.   
In the context of killing innocents collaterally in war, the Consent Principle 
has little application. The civilians we collaterally put at the risk in 
furtherance of achieving a just aim generally do not consent to that risk. 
Exceptions include those wars of humanitarian intervention in which the 
people of a country consent to the risks we would have to impose upon them 
in furtherance of defeating a threat they face – either an oppressive domestic 
regime or an invading foreign aggressor. Such cases, though, are rare.11    
The Beneficiary Principle also has little application to morally assessing the 
risks we impose on foreign civilians in war. Generally we do not benefit the 
civilians of the country we are warring against when we collaterally put them 
at risk of being immiserated, maimed, and killed – even if the war is just. 
The benefits derived from doing so accrue to us rather than to them. So a 
particular reason in favor subjecting them to risks of harm and death – a 
reason articulated in the Beneficiary Principle – is absent. Again, wars of 
humanitarian intervention might serve as an exception in this generalization. 
Such wars, if they are just, will benefit the civilian population – or more 
likely a sizeable segment therein – of the country being assisted. If these 
                                                          
11 See (Scheid, 2014). 
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civilians are in fact expected beneficiaries of the military intervention, then 
the Beneficiary Principle might partially discount the negative value of the 
some of the harms we impose upon them. This is tantamount to saying that 
the standard of care owed to them is less stringent than it would be if they 
were not expected beneficiaries.12  
The Reciprocation Principle likewise has little relevance to morally assessing 
the risks we impose on foreign civilians in war. Except in a levée en masse or 
in guerilla warfare in which civilians serve as ‘part-time’ combatants (a 
characteristic of how some of the Viet Cong operated during the Vietnam 
War) civilians do not reciprocally impose threats on combatants. Recall that 
according to the Reciprocation Principle, when you impose a non-consensual, 
non-beneficial risk on an innocent, that act diminishes your standing to 
complain should that individual reciprocally impose a non-consensual, non-
beneficial risk on you. This in turn affects how we weigh any harms resulting 
from that exchange. Now, the sense in which a typical civilian in a war 
imposes a non-consensual, non-beneficial risk on combatants fighting on the 
other side is so attenuated compared to the sense in which a typical 
combatant imposes a non-consensual, non-beneficial risk on civilians that it 
cannot be said to substantially diminish the civilian’s standing to complain 
about the harms she collaterally suffers. The upshot is that the Reciprocation 
Principle provides virtually no basis for diminishing the negative weight of 
the collateral harms civilians suffer in war.  
I have claimed that in general there are pro tanto reasons to partially 
discount the harms resulting from risks imposed on individuals who either a) 
consent to the risks imposed upon them, b) are expected to derive a net 
benefit from such risks, or c) refrain from reciprocally imposing such risks on 
others. This applies univocally, to wars and civil life. It just so happens that 
it tends to apply far more often in the latter. The vast majority of civilians 
we put at risk in furtherance of pursuing just aims in war do not consent to 
those risks, are not expected to derive a net benefit from such risks, and are 
not reciprocally imposing such risks on our soldiers. It is safe, then, to make 
the following statistical claim: for the vast majority of foreign civilians we 
put at risk in war, and the vast majority of domestic civilians we put at risk 
                                                          
12 For a thoroughgoing discussion of this issue see (McMahan, 2010). 
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in civil life by way of undertaking public projects and policies, the constraint 
against imposing risks on the foreign civilians is greater than the stringency 
of the constraint against imposing risks on the domestic civilians. (Or, more 
accurately, there is a pro tanto reason for thinking that the constraints 
differ). The result is that there is at least one important albeit contingent 
reason for thinking that we have greater duties of care toward enemy 
civilians in wartime than toward our own civilians in peacetime.  
So when it comes to weighing the harms resulting from imposed risks on 
innocents in the context of domestic civil life, there tends to be for the vast 
majority of individuals a ‘thumb on the scales’ in favor of imposing that risk. 
But in the context of war, that ‘thumb on the scales’ is absent. Of course, 
the risks we impose on foreign civilians in war are far, far greater than the 
risks we impose on each other when we build nuclear power plants, allow 
private transportation, develop health care and criminal justice systems, and 
so on. The claim I am making, though, is that when the imposed risks 
manifest by causing death or some other grievous harm, how we ought to 
weigh that harm depends in part on whether the Beneficiary, Consent, and 
Reciprocation Principles apply. Hence, whether imposing the risk in the first 
place satisfies the proportionality constraint likewise depends on whether 
those principles apply. And since whether those principles apply reliably 
track whether the risks are imposed on our own people in civil life or on 
enemy civilians in the context of war, it turns out that we ought to weigh the 
harms we collaterally inflict on innocents in civil life differently from how we 
weigh the harms we collaterally inflict on innocents in war.  
This point can be put differently. Whether it is permissible to impose some 
risk of harm – n% of death – on an innocent will of course depend on what 
the value of ‘n’ is. But it also depends, I claim, on whether the Beneficiary, 
Consent, and Reciprocation Principles apply. This is because, in determining 
the permissibility of imposing that risk, we have to morally weigh the 
prospect of its manifestation against the loss of whatever goods would be 
gained by imposing the risk. In morally weighing the prospect of its 
manifestation, we (standardly) multiply the probability of its manifestation 
by the disvalue of its occurrence. And how we weigh the disvalue of its 
occurrence depends on whether the Beneficiary, Consent, and Reciprocation 
Principles apply to the risk that resulted in the harm. If any of them do, 
then the disvalue of the harm is partially discounted. Consequently, its 
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expected value is less than it otherwise would be, which in turn can affect 
whether the risk satisfies the proportionality constraint. Consequently, the 
Beneficiary, Consent, and Reciprocation Principles can affect the calculation 
of proportionality regardless of what the value of ‘n’ is. The risk of the harm 
might be very high or very small – either way, the Beneficiary, Consent, and 
Reciprocation Principles have a role to play in determining how we assess the 
permissibility of imposing the risk.  
One might argue, though, that as ‘n’ increases to certainty – that is, as the 
probability of imposing a lethal risk approaches certainty – the amount of 
good that imposing the harm must do to be justified becomes 
disproportionately greater.  So, for example, suppose that we can permissibly 
impose a 5% chance of death on an innocent (who does not benefit from, 
consent to, or reciprocally impose that risk) in order to prevent a 100% 
chance of death from befalling some other innocent. At first this might seem 
to suggest that imposing a harm on an innocent is permissible so long as it 
prevents 20 times that harm from befalling someone else. Accordingly, we 
can kill one innocent to prevent 20 other innocents from being killed. But 
against this, we might be morally required to be risk averse with respect to 
the risk of harm we impose. If this is correct, the relationship between the 
risk of harm we impose and the amount of good that must be done in order 
for the risk to be justified is not linear. So we can consistently say that it is 
permissible to impose a 5% chance of death on an innocent in order to 
prevent a 100% chance of death from befalling some other innocent, while 
simultaneously denying that we can kill one innocent to prevent 20 other 
innocents from being killed. If the claim that we ought to be morally risk 
averse is correct (which is an issue beyond the scope of this paper) then it 
suggests that the large risks we impose on foreign civilians in war ought to 
receive disproportionately greater weight than the small risks we impose on 
our own people in civil life.  
So if we morally ought to be risk averse, it follows that the standards 
governing risks imposed on civilians in war are more stringent than the 
standards governing risks imposed on civilians in civil life, since the risks we 
impose on the former tend to be far greater than those we impose on the 
latter. This would serve as an additional reason for thinking that we ought to 
weigh the harms inflicted collaterally on innocent civilians in war more 
heavily than the harms we inflict collaterally on our own people in the 
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context of civil life. But regardless of whether we morally ought to be risk 
averse in this way, I have argued that there are additional reasons, reflected 
in the Beneficiary, Consent, and Reciprocation Principles, which generate a 
greater duty of care toward foreign innocent civilians in war than toward our 
own in civil life.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The civilians upon whom we impose risks in war rarely see the benefits of 
doing so (except, perhaps, in wars of humanitarian intervention), whereas 
those put at risk by socially beneficial projects and policies will typically see 
the benefits. And the civilians upon whom we impose risk in war rarely 
consent to our acts (again, excepting wars of humanitarian intervention), 
whereas those put at risk by socially beneficial projects and policies often do. 
Finally, many of the risks we impose in civil life are imposed reciprocally; a 
relationship of mutual risk-imposition is typically absent between civilians 
and combatants in war.  
I argued that these factors give us reasons to decrease the negative weight of 
the harms resulting from beneficial, consensual, or reciprocally imposed risks. 
Since risks satisfying such conditions are far more prevalent in domestic civil 
life than in war, we will in general have a reason to adopt more stringent 
standards of risk-imposition in war than we do in civil life. So though the 
standards for imposing risks on innocents in war and in domestic civil life are 
at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, those 
very principles will yield in these two contexts different ‘in-practice’ 
standards of risk-imposition. Put differently, there is at least one important 
reason for thinking that the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in 
war is greater than the duty of care we owe toward one another in domestic 
civil life.  
I believe this has an interesting implication for how we think in the broadest 
terms about the morality of war. We often think of war as a context in 
which, morally speaking, much is permitted that is usually prohibited, in 
order to secure a just peace. On this view, morality slackens in war. But if 
what I have argued is correct, this gets things exactly backwards. In waging 
war, we impose risks on innocents. But the standards for imposing risks on 
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innocents are a central element governing not just war, but a peaceful social 
order as well. But they do not apply in the same way: the duties of care as 
they apply to warfare, I have argued, are more stringent than the duties of 
care as they apply to civil life. If this is correct, the constraints governing the 
risks we can impose in furtherance of a just peace are more stringent than 
the constraints governing the risks we can impose within that just peace. In 
this respect, morality is more restrictive in war than it is domestic life. 
Comparing what we owe innocents in domestic live with what we own them 
in war lends some credence to contingent pacifism.  
Of course, there might be other moral considerations from the other direction 
ultimately swamping the reasons for thinking that the duties of care toward 
innocents in war are more stringent than the duties of care toward innocents 
in domestic life. But the lesson here is that addressing the morality of 
imposing risks in war requires appreciating the fact that duty of care owed to 
our own innocents can come apart from those owed to the innocent foreign 
civilians we put at risk in waging even just wars.  
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